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Summary findings
Cereal production accounts for about 70 percent of all  The benefits of this progranm  over the traditional
agricultural land in Morocco. Cereal producer prices,  insurance scheme are that it mtinimizes  the risk of moral
influenced by the government, are higher than world  hazard and adverse selection and promotes a streamlined
prices. Production is divided into six broad agroclimatic  pay-out process. These features make the program more
zones. About half of cereal production is concentrated in  attractive to international re-insurers and investors in
the favorable and intermediate zones; the rest occurs  capital markets.
mostly in less favorable (arid and semi-arid) zones, with  A rainfall-indexed insurance product is feasible in
average annual rainfall below 450 millimeters.  Morocco, where the statistical correlation between
Skees and colleagues assess the feasibility of rainfall-  rainfall and cereal revenues is rather strong in 17
based index insurance to provide effective, low-cost  provinces in the more favorable agroclimatic zones.
drought insurance for Moroccan farmers and rural  Proportional rainfall insurance contracts would pay the
dwellers. Their analysis focuses on Morocco's three rnain  insured an amount based on the shortfall in actual
cereal crops-hard  wheat, soft wheat, and barley-using  rainfall during a set period compared with the trigger
data on annual production and planting from  1978-99.  rainfall. The contracts could be purchased in any
Maize is included in some of the analysis.  amount, allowing farmers to insure the full amount of
their expected revenue if they wish.
This paper-a  joint product of Private Sector Development and Finance Group, Middle East and North  Africa Region;
Rural Development, Development Research  Group; and Financial Sector Department-is  part of a larger effort in the Bank
to analyze  the feasibility  of weather-basedindex insurance markets in developingcountries. Copiesof the paper are available
free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Pauline Kokila, room MC3-510,
telephone 202-473-3716, fax 202-522-1151, email address pkokila@worldbank.org. Policy Research  Working Papers are
also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  sgober@worldbank.org,
pvarangis(cworldbank.org, rlester@worldbank.org, or vkalavakonda@worldbank.org. April 2001.  (37 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development  issues.  An objective  of the series  is  to get  the  findings  out quickly,  even if  the presentations  are  less  than  fully  polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of the  authors  and should  be cited  accordingly.  The  findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are  entirely  those  of the authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the  view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
countries  they represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterPOLICY  RESEARCH WORKING  PAPER
DEVELOPING RAINFALL-BASED  INDEX INSURANCE
IN MOROCCO
by Jerry  Skees, Stephanie Gober, Panos Varangis,
Rodney Lester, and ViJay KalavakondaTABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION  ..................................................... 2
FEATURES  OF MOROCCAN  AGRICULTURE  AND  WEATHER-RELATED  RISKS ...................  ............................ 2
Cereal Agriculture ....................................................... 3
Rainfall, Drought, and the Cereal Growing Cycle  ....................................................... 4
Farmers' Risk Management for Drought ....................................................... 7
Effects of Drought on Agricultural Lending in Morocco ........................  .............................. 8
CURRENT  MOROCCAN  DROUGHT  INSURANCE  SCHEME  ....................................................... 9
History and Description of Current Scheme ....................................................... 9
Results of Current Scheme .........................................  11
Observations on Current Scheme  .........................................  11
Weaknesses of Current Scheme  .........................................  13
ANALYSIS  OF THE FEASIBILITY  OF RAINFALL  CONTRACTS  .........................................  13
Adjusting Yield Data .........................................  14
Designing Rainfall Contracts to Reduce Relative Risk .........................................  19
Rainfall Plus Area Revenue Contracts  .........................................  29
CONCLUSIONS  AND RECOMMENDATIONS  ....................................  30
REFERENCES  ....................................  32
ANNEX 1:  CALCULATING  A DROUGHT  THRESHOLD  ....................................  33
ANNEX 2:  DE-TRENDING  YIELD DATA  ....................................  35
1INTRODUCTION'
1.  Interest in developing catastrophic weather insurance products for rural dwellers
in developing countries has grown dramatically in recent years.  This interest has been
fueled by the successful introduction of new products for the managem,ent of systemic
risks  to  international  financial  markets  in  recent  years.  These  products  include
catastrophe bonds and area yield crop insurance options, and their success suggests that it
may  be  possible  to  package  catastrophic  weather  and  natural  event  risks  facing
developing  countries  and  reallocate  them  to  international markets  in  a  cost  efficient
manner, bringing  affordable risk management services to rural dwellers in agriculture-
dependent countries.
2.  The World Bank, in collaboration with the International Food Research Institute,
the Istituto di Studi Economici e Sociali, and several universities and private consultants,
is conducting a study to explore the feasibility of weather-based insurance in four
developing countries:  Ethiopia, Morocco, Nicaragua, and Tunisia.  The study explores
the feasibility of weather-based index insurance for providing cost-effective risk
management services to rural people for coping with catastrophic events that can
profoundly depress agricultural production and rural incomes.
3.  This report on the feasibility study in Morocco has several main objectives:  (a) to
assess Morocco's  exposure to weather-related risk and the need for weather risk
management products; (b) to document the functions and experience of private and public
institutions that currently provide agricultural insurance in this country; and (c) most
importantly, to simulate the effect of rainfall-based index contracts in reducing the
revenue volatility of grain producers in Morocco and examine the costs relative to the
insurance coverage provided.
FEATURES OF MOROCCAN AGRICULTURE AND  WEATHER-RELATED RISKS
4.  In Morocco, 47 percent of the total population and most of the poor live in rural
areas.  Economic developments in agriculture play a crucial role in determining the living
standards of rural households.  On average, agriculture accounts for about 17 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP), but this percentage fluctuates, mainly due to climatic-
especially rainfall-variations.  Almost 90 percent of Moroccan agriculture is non-
irrigated, and since most of Morocco's  crops rely on adequate rainfall, this has translated
to wide variations in yields and production.  For example, the production of cereals fell
from 9.5 million tons in 1994 to 1.6 million tons in 1995 due to drought.  Large-scale
irrigation schemes are administered by the Offices Regionaux de Mise en Valeur Agricole
IJerry  Skees is H.B. professor in the department of agricultural economics  at the University of Kentucky,
Stephanie Gober is a Financial Sector Specialist at the Middle East and North Africa Region at the World
Bank, Panos Varangis is a Senior Economist at the Research Department of the World Bank, Rodney
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2(ORMVA), but localized on-farm irrigation is alsQ important.  The main crops grown in
irrigated areas are higher value crops such as legumes, horticultural, fruits, and industrial
crops, but cereals are also grown in some irrigated areas.
5.  Agriculture in Morocco is characterized by a dichotomy between the traditional
and commercial sectors.  The traditional sector consists of small farms in rain-fed areas
involved predominantly in cereal, legume, and livestock production.  The commercial
sector operates mainly in irrigated areas. Farm surveys indicate that about 70 percent of
farms are small in size (under 5 hectares) and account for 23 percent of total land under
cultivation.  Farms under 20 hectares (ha) in size represent 96 percent of the number of
farms in operation.  The average size of a farm in Morocco is 5.7 ha.
Cereal Agriculture
6.  Cereal  production  is  the most  significant agricultural  resource,  accounting  for
about 70 percent of all agricultural lands.  Cereal producer prices are heavily influenced
by the government and are set at relatively high levels compared to world prices.  This is
to encourage cereal production in the country.  At present wheat prices are around 250
MAD per quintal 2 (US$250 per ton).  The main cereal crops are hard wheat, soft wheat
and barley.  Recent studies have shown a high correlation between cereal production and
agricultural  GDP.  This  indicates  that  cereal production  is  the major  determinant  of
agricultural  GDP,  and  the  high  variability  of  production  leads  to  high  variations  in
agricultural GDP.
7.  Cereal production is divided into six broad agro-climatic zones according to their
cereal "production potential".  The zones are favorable,  intermediaire, difavorable  sud,
defavorable orientale, montagneuse, and saharienne.  In broad terms these agro-climatic
zones relate to topography but most importantly to rainfall, which decreases from north to
south and from west to east.  About 50 percent of cereal production is concentrated in the
first two zones (favorable and intermediate), with the rest of the production in the less
favorable production zones:  arid and semi-arid areas with average annual rainfall below
450 mm.
8.  During the late 1980s and 1990s, the cereal-growing area has increased, resulting
in  increases in cereal production.  At the same time,  however,  the volatility  of cereal
production has increased.  Average cereal yields have fluctuated from 0.5 to  1.5 tons per
ha in the last 20 years.  The coefficient of variation in cereal yields over this period has
been around 40 percent.  Most of the yield variation, as expected, is in the less favorable
growing  areas.  For  example, the  coefficient  of variation  of  cereal yields  is  over  70
percent  in  the  Saharan  zone  and  around  40  to  50  percent  in  the  mountainous  and
unfavorable southern regions.  In contrast, yield variation is only about 24 percent in the
favorable region.  The high variability  of yields among zones and in different years has
very important implications for the design of crop insurance schemes to protect farmers.
9.  The increase in yield and production variability  in the late  1980s and  1990s has
been attributed to greater variability in climate and rainfall during this period but also to
2 One quintal = 100 kilograms = 0.1 metric tons
3the expansion of cereal production to less favorable lands in areas with  less rainfall and
more variable rainfall.  It appears that price incentives have pushed cereal production to
less productive areas.  In addition, the increased use of improved  seeds and fertilizers,
while increasing overall yields, also tends to increase variability because these seeds and
fertilizers require water to achieve the desired gains and can result in lower yields if rain
is lacking.
Rainfall, Drought, and the Cereal Growing Cycle
10.  Morocco receives most of its precipitation during the northern hemisphere winter
semester (October-March), and the most significant climatic feature is rainfall (Lamb and
Peppler,  1988).  Precipitation  is  inversely related to  the concurrent  state of the North
Atlantic Oscillation (NOA) 3. This inverse relationship between Moroccan precipitation
and the NOA is stronger around the Atlantic coast.  Approximately  95 to 98 percent of
rainfall occurs in the country during the period from October to May and this coincides
with cereal production cycle.  There are three important phases for cereal production in
Morocco:
*  October-December:  seeding phase
*  January-February:  vegetation growth
*  March-May:  flowering, reproduction, and spiking
11.  While the variation in total annual rainfall is typically relatively low (coefficient
of variation of 16.5 percent), monthly rainfall is very erratic.  For example, the coefficient
of  variation  in  monthly  rainfall  between  November  and  April  exceeds  50  percent.
Among regions, the higher coefficients of variation of rainfall are associated with regions
that also have lower average rainfall.  Those are the less favorable  regions, mainly the
Saharan, the mountainous, and the unfavorable southern regions.
12.  Since 1980, many diverse studies have been conducted  on drought in Morocco.
In  1988 Lamb  and  Peppler  studied  large-scale  atmospheric  features  associated  with
drought in Morocco.  Rognon in  1996 analyzed different droughts that struck Morocco
between 1944 and 1984 and noted that they were not persistent and not geographically
widespread.  Since 1980, however, droughts in Morocco have been very  severe with a
decrease in precipitation of about 25 percent, compared to historical averages.
13.  Studies have shown  that the country is stricken by drought  once in  10 years  on
average, but with no chronological pattern.  Other studies about drought forecasting also
found  that  it  is  not  possible  to  make  any  rainfall  forecast  at the  beginning  of  the
agricultural season.  Drought in Morocco is in fact a phenomenon related to the NOA and
is difficult to characterize nationwide or in any specific agricultural region.  Studies are
still underway to compare drought events with each other to find a sustainable forecasting
relationship.  El Mourid and Watts are working on spring rainfall forecasting using fall
3The  term North  Atlantic  Oscillation  (NOA;  Rogers, 1984)  refers  to a large-scale  alternation  of
atmospheric mass between the North Atlantic regions of subtropical high pressure (centered near the
Azores)  and subpolar  low  pressure  (extending  south  and east of Greenland).
4rainfall in Morocco.  Currently, the Direction de la Meteorologie Nationale is conducting
research on the relationship between sea level temperature and precipitation in Morocco.
14.  In  1998 Barakat and Handoufe worked on agricultural drought-related problems
in Morocco.  Drought may be  defined and viewed from  different  angles; accordingly,
they defined  agricultural  drought  as  a rainfall  deficit  sufficient  to  cause a  significant
reduction in agricultural production.  In the past it has been difficult to set a minimum
rainfall  threshold  below  which  a  drought  year  may  be  declared  nationwide.  Many
authors used to set a threshold arbitrarily (e.g., rainfall below  10 percent of normal), but
these  methods  are  not  realistic.  Barakat  and  Handoufe  instead  used  agricultural
production data for which they estimated the normal value through  a regression  across
time.  They then determined the production threshold below which production in a given
year is considered drought-stricken.  Details of this work are provided in Annex  I to this
report.




Rainfall  Security  Alarm  Tolerance  Critical  Maximum  Year
(mm)  Threshold  Threshold  Threshold  Threshold  Deficit
Taza
(629.2)  31.2  32.2  38.9  39.7  69.0  1994/95
Meknes
(555.2)  19.3  31.0  32.5  34.5  53.7  1994/95
Azilal
(508.0)  22.7  25.2  37.1  41.3  70.0  1980/81
Fes
(503.2)  26.5  26.9  33.4  34.3  68.9  1994/95
Khemisset
(483.8)  17.8  20.1  27.5  34.3  50.7  1994/95
Ben Slimane
(458.6)  10.5  20.1  30.2  38.9  70.2  1994/95
Safi
(366.0)  13.3  25.2  26.2  36.6  60.0  1986/87
Settat
(358.2)  17.2  25.5  41.8  45.2  60.2  1994/95
Average  19.8  25.8  33.5  38.1  62.9
Coefficient
of Variation  34.3  17.0  16.5  10.3  12.5
CV (%)  _
Source: Barakat and Handoufe, 1998.
Note:  In the above table,
*  The security  threshold  is the deficit  reached  without  any fear of drought.
*  The alarm  threshold  corresponds  to the minimum  rainfall  deficit  registered  during  a drought  year.
*  The tolerance  threshold  is the maximum  deficit  reached  without  the occurrence  of a drought.
*  The critical  threshold  is the deficit  from which  the occurrence  of a drought  is certain.
*  The maximum  deficit  is the greatest  deficit  reached  during  the time series  studied.
15.  Yacoubi et al (1998) also found the following interesting  results for the  Settat
region in Morocco:
*  There is only 12 percent chance of having a drought year when none of the
first three months  of production  (October, November,  and December) is
deficient in rainfall.
*  There is 43 percent chance of having a drought year when the month of
October is deficient in rainfall.
*  When both the months of October and November are deficient in rainfall,
the probability of having a drought year is 55 percent
616.  In this  case, drought  is specifically defined in agronomic  terms:  a province  is
considered dry  when the yield  is too  low.  In reality, the concept  of drought  in  arid
regions across the world is beyond the scope of this report. 4 Yacoubi et al in their study
found that many rainfall  factors could be  at the origin  of yield  shortfall in  a specific
region.  They accordingly classified drought years in six categories as follow:
*  Type 1 drought year:  rainfall deficit at the end of the production cycle only
*  Type 2 drought year:  rainfall deficit in the middle of the cycle only
*  Type 3 drought year:  rainfall deficit in the middle and end of the cycle only
*  Type 4 drought year:  rainfall deficit at the beginning of the cycle only
*  Type 5 drought year:  rainfall deficit at the beginning and end of the cycle only
*  Type 6 drought year:  rainfall deficit at the beginning and middle of the cycle only
*  Type 7 drought year:  rainfall deficit during all three parts of the cycle
17.  Yacoubi et  al  (1998)  found  a  significant positive  linear  relationship  between
cereal production and annual rainfall in non-irrigated areas. As a result, farmers in these
regions  face high  production  risks  and  consequently  high  income  variability.  Other
studies found that  yields are linearly related to cumulative  rainfall in  January through
March.  However,  aggregated  rainfall during  that  period  of  time  does  not  completely
explain the relationship. Especially, high geographically concentrated rainfall may lead to
low aggregated yields. Likewise, high cumulative rainfall may  lead to  low aggregated
yields,  if the rainfall  is concentrated  in  a  restraint  period  instead of  being  uniformly
distributed over time (Mission Report; The World Bank, May 2000).
18.  In response to the persistent problems of drought in Morocco, the government has
established a National  Drought  Observatory.  Its objectives  are: a)  to  create an  early
warning system permitting the launching of an emergency program to ease the short-term
effects of drought; and b) to improve decision-making tools in the medium to longer-term
that integrate drought risks in economic planning.
Farmers' Risk Management for Drought
19.  Farmers exposed to drought over time have adopted strategies to cope with this
risk.  Examples  are  water  conservation,  use  of  drought-resistant  seeds,  diversified
farming systems, food storage, use of livestock, and the development of off-farm sources
of income.  In particular,  several studies, in addition to field visits, have indicated that
there  is  a  high  dependence  on  off-farm  income  to  sustain  small  farm  households.
Livestock (mainly sheep) also play an important role in drought risk reduction, although
farmers often complain that they have to sell their livestock in difficult times when prices
are lower.
20.  There  are  also  differences  among  zones  in  the  strategies  used  to  deal  with
drought.  In less favorable  areas (rainfall  of approximately  200-400  mm),  a common
4  See  Wilhite  D.  A.  and  Glantz  M.  H.  "Understanding  the  drought  phenomenon:  the  role  of  definitions".
Water  Inter  1985;  10.
7practice is to adopt low input application, increasing input application onlLy  when climatic
(rain) conditions appear  favorable.  This strategy has the impact of lowering potential
yields.  Farmers in these areas also tend to use local varieties of seeds most resistant to
drought, without regard to their  other qualities.  Farmers are thus using the seeds that
have the lowest yields and which are least responsive to fertilizers.  In the favorable areas
in the northwest  of the country, farmers use a higher input technology  as they have a
greater certainty of achieving an acceptable return.
21.  The lack of access to financial services also seems to create problems for farmers
dealing with drought.  In good years, farmers tend to store their grain surplus by feeding
it to livestock.  Grain storage is highly risky due to the potential for vermin infestation,
but  feeding surplus grain to  livestock is also a risky approach to  savings.  In drought
years, livestock and thus savings, are threatened by the absence of drinking water.  When
farmers are in need of cash, they are often forced to sell livestock when prices are low.
Alternative financial  savings mechanisms  appear to be  unavailable  or undesirable.  In
particular, banking services are not easily accessible to farmers who live in remote areas
or who may be poorly educated or illiterate. These facts suggest that the introduction of
micro-financial services in rural areas could complement insurance schemes to help rural
inhabitants manage their drought-related risk.
22.  These observations  have  significant  implications  for  the  design  of  a  drought
insurance scheme.  The introduction of drought insurance in Morocco should not attract
farmers away from traditional  forms of risk management, which  are important for the
security of rural household incomes.  However, there are limited alternatives available to
assist farmers in mitigating  drought risks.  Insurance can provide financial security to
farmers  to  survive  until  the  next  crop  season,  but  should  not  encourage  high  risk
cropping,  adoption  of  inappropriate  technologies  or  expansion  of  production  into
inappropriate lands.
Effects of Drought on Agricultural Lending in Morocco
23.  The development  of drought  insurance  in  Morocco  is  closely  linked  to  rural
credit, in particular as a means of reducing the exposure of Caisse Nationale de Credit
Agricole (CNCA, the public agricultural bank) to climatic risks.  Although there has not
been a formal study of the link between drought and loan delinquency, an important issue
in Moroccan agricultural  policy has been the  government's  forgiveness  of  farm loans
following drought.  It could be  argued that borrowers'  expectations of debt relief  may
have contributed to their reluctance to repay loans.  It has therefore been recognized that
the development of formal drought insurance could help improve borrower repayment
discipline by diminishing farmers' inability to repay following a drought.
24.  CNCA finances about 11 percent  of loans to the Moroccan economy and more
than 80 percent of all loans to the agricultural sector.  Although most of CNCA's  lending
is agricultural,  almost  one-third  of its  total  portfolio  is composed  of  non-agricultural
loans.  Over the past several years, CNCA's financial position has been weak, with a high
level of non-performing loans, under-provisioning,  and operating  losses.  In  1997, the
bank  was restructured  and  new management  was brought  in to  work to  correct these
8problems, but-due  in part to the negative effect of severe, successive droughts since the
reorganization-significant  progress has not yet been achieved.
25.  In 1999, CNCA made the purchase of drought  insurance a mandatory condition
for obtaining an agricultural loan in the areas covered under the current drought insurance
scheme.  This requirement is widely credited with the increase in insurance subscriptions
this year, but it is not known if the cost of this mandatory insurance contributed to the
significant drop in the number of CNCA borrowers in the last year (from 287,941 in 1998
to  194,093 in  1999).  Ideally, an insurance product would be a tool not only to protect
CNCA's  loan repayment  but  also to  help  ensure that  financially  viable  farmers have
access to credit.
26.  The Moroccan government has incurred significant fiscal costs in its support of
CNCA and agricultural lending, but also for general drought relief.  However, in addition
to  these, the catastrophic  drought  of the  1999-2000 crop year  led the  government  to
announce a massive relief program.  Over an 18 month period, the government will spend
6.5  billion  MAD  (about  US$650  million)  on  drought  relief,  for  programs  to  protect
livestock and forests as well as to provide water for villages and herds in drought-stricken
areas.  Given the significant costs of providing drought relief to farmers and supporting
CNCA's  financial viability, the Moroccan government has expressed  strong interest in
finding cost-effective ways to aid farmers in managing their drought risk and improving
their ability to repay agricultural loans consistently.
CURRENT MOROCCAN  DROUGHT INSURANCE SCHEME
History and Description of Current Scheme
27.  During the last ten years there have been several important studies on the subject of
drought  insurance  in  Morocco.  Specifically  worth  mentioning  are  the  "Report  on
Agricultural  Risk Management  and  Insurance Fund",  written  in  1993 by  Agricultural
Risk Management Limited for KfW and the World Bank, and the World Bank's "MENA
Rural Finance:  Performance, Constraints And Options" 2000 report on Egypt, Morocco
and Tunisia.  This report provides a brief assessment of recent developments in Moroccan
drought  insurance  and  focuses on  the implications  for the development  of alternative
insurance based on a rainfall index.
28.  The  Morocco  National  Rural  Finance  Project  (Loan  3662-MOR)  included  a
specific  provision  for  the  development  of  an  insurance  scheme  under  institutional
development that was not to be funded by the World Bank.  This led to the  1993 study
mentioned above.  Following the recommendations of the study, a pilot project to provide
drought insurance in cereal production was implemented starting with the 1995-96 crop
season.  The program was to be managed by Mutuelle Agricole Marocaine d 'Assurances
(MAMDA, the agricultural mutual insurance company).
29.  This  insurance  scheme has  been  operating  for  five  years.  Until  1998-99 the
program  provided  insurance  if  yields  fell below  certain thresholds.  Three  threshold
9levels were set:  0.8, 1.6, and 2.4 tons per ha.  The indemnification amoints  were set at
850  MAD/ha,  1,700  MAD/ha,  and  2,380  MAD/ha  respectively,  and  the  respective
premiums were 102 MAD/ha, 204 MAD/ha and 306 MAD/ha.
30.  In  1999-2000, the program started indemnifying threshold levels of revenue (but
still  insurance is triggered  by  yield shortfalls); that  is, farmers  are now insured  for a
specified revenue level of either 1,000 MAD/ha, 2,000 MAD/ha, or 3,000 MAD/ha rather
than.being  insured for a specific yield levels.  During the first year of this program, the
Moroccan government  subsidized  50 percent  of the premium  costs  for this  insurance
scheme, and the premium cost to the farmers for the scheme was 60 MAD/ha for Level 1
(i.e.,  1,000 MAD/ha),  120 MAD/ha  for  Level  2,  and  180 MAD/ha  for  Level  3.  In
percentage terms, this  means that  in the first year of this program, the farmers paid a
premium  of  six  percent  of  the  coverage  amount  and  the  government  subsidized  six
percent, which translates to a total risk premium of 12 percent . The government subsidy
will be phased out over a period of five years, with the farmers'  rates increasing by 15
percent per year to replace the subsidy.
31.  In  order  for  the  insurance  scheme  to  begin  making  indemnity  payments,  an
official drought declaration must be made, based on a joint decision of the MoA and the
MoF, using reports from the MoA's provincial services to verify that the realized average
yield achieved in a given rural commune is less than 60 percent of the average historical
area yield for that commune.  At Level 1, the insurance pay-out is based on the realized
average area yield for the rural commune.  For the other two levels, the pay-out is based
on assessments of the individual farm's realized yield.  Under the terms of the agreement
for this insurance scheme, the drought declaration must be made no later than May 10;
the  individual  farm  assessments  must  be  completed  by  July  15;  and  all  indemnity
payments are to be completed by July 31.
32.  For all three insurance levels, the appropriate yield (either average area yield or
individual farm yield) is multiplied by the price (set at 130 MAD/quintal for barley, 200
MAD/quintal  for soft  wheat, and  220 MAD/quintal  for hard  wheat)  to  determine the
farmers' "actual" income, and this "actual" income is subtracted from the insured income
level  to  determine  the  amount  of  the  indemnity  payment.  The  formula  for
indemnification is thus:
Insured Level - (Unit Price x Yield) = Indemnification
Example.  (2,000 MAD/ha insured) - (200 MAD/quintal x 6 quintals/ha ffarmer 's
actual yield usedfor  Level 2 insurance]) = 800 MAD/ha indemnification.
33.  Once  a  drought  is  declared, the  current  insurance  scheme  obtains  funds  for
indemnification from the following sources, in order of use:
(i)  premiums paid in by farmers, net of the cost of reinsurance, cover
losses up to a maximum of 59 million MAD,
Distributions  costs  for this scheme  are absorbed  by the two institutions  which sell policies,  MAMDA  and
CNCA,  and the premiums  received  do not cover these  or other administrative  costs of the scheme.
10(ii)  excess-of-loss reinsurance covers losses in excess of 59 million
MAD, up to 80.78 million MAD at a cost of 4.25%, then the cost
increases to 5.15% for losses from 80.78 million MAD up to
maximum losses of 172 million MAD 6,
(iii)  the government's  contributions cover losses exceeding 172 million
MAD, until these contributions are exhausted 7. The contributions
are:
*  120,000,000 MAD per year and
*  subsidies for the farmers' insurance premiums, calculated
based on the area insured, but limited to no more than 40
million MAD in the first year, phasing out to zero by the
sixth year,
(iv)  interest or dividend income on any of the above resources is used
after the government's contributions are exhausted, and
(v)  a contribution from MAMDA of up to 80 million MAD is used
when all other resources have been exhausted.
Results of Current Scheme
34.  A total of 111,697 ha were subscribed in the insurance scheme in 1999-2000, with
47,114 ha (42 percent)  at Level  1 (1,000 MAD/ha), 36,672 ha (33 percent) at Level  2
(2,000 MAD/ha) and 27,911 ha (25 percent)  at Level 3 (3,000 MAD/ha).  CNCA sold
insurance to a total of 18,135 farmers for coverage of 102,860 ha (92 percent of total land
insured).  Almost all the land insured at Level  1 or Level 2 was covered by policies sold
by  CNCA, but policies  sold by MAMDA covered  26 percent  of the land  covered by
insurance at Level 3.  In total, MAMDA sold insurance for 8,837 ha (8 percent of total
land insured).  Of the insurance sold directly by MAMDA, 7,362 ha (83 percent) were at
the highest level  of indemnification (3,000  MAD/ha).  This  level  is generally  sold to
larger farms:  a total of  770 farmers bought insurance from either MAMDA or CNCA at
Level  3, which corresponds to an average of 36.2 ha insured per farmer.  The average
number  of  hectares  covered  by  individual insurance  policies  at  Level  I  was  3.6  ha,
compared to 6.8 ha Level 2.
35.  The total amount of premiums collected for  1999-2000 was about 12.25 million
MAD  (or US$1.2  million),  and  the  total  indemnification  paid  in the  same year  was
around 200 million MAD (US$20 million).  The indemnification paid this year consumed
all reinsurance funds, all contributions from the government, and part of MAMDA's  80
million MAD contribution, as described above.
Observations on Current Scheme
36.  The current insurance scheme is available in 18 Moroccan provinces or wilayate
(excluding certain parts of 3 provinces), with a total possible subscription area of 300,000
6 This reinsurance scheme was begun with international reinsurers in 1998 on a five-year basis.  The losses
from the 1999 drought exceeded the total premiums which will be paid to the reinsurers over the five year
period.
7 The government's  contributions to the scheme will end once MAMDA's stability reserve reaches 450
million MAD.
11ha.  In 1999-2000, only  111,697 ha were subscribed, a participation rate of 37 percent.
Although this is a low participation rate, it is higher than previous years.  According to a
review of the scheme conducted in September 1998, the main reasons for the relatively
low participation in the insurance scheme are:
*  Farmers'  lack of familiarity  with and understanding  of  insurance.  Education and
technical  assistance  are very  important, and the  results  are better  where  there  are
active extension agents and energetic farmer leaders.
*  Low level of  indemnification  (income coverage), which  is a particular  problem for
larger farmers.
*  Narrow coverage.  Farmers want a more generalized  insurance scheme in terms of
both the perils and the crops which are covered.
*  Linkage  to  average yield for  commune  (for  the  1,000 MAD/ha  insurance  level).
Farmers prefer individualized coverage.
*  Long delays in receiving indemnification.  Last year it took  more than four or five
months for indemnity payments to be made to farmers.  This year, the team was told
that the official drought declaration would be made in May, in order for payments to
be made by August at the latest (missing the contractual deadline of July 31).  For the
1999-2000 crop year, if there had been a total declaration of drought, well over 6,000
farms with coverage at 2,000 MAD/ha and 3,000 MAD/ha would need to have been
assessed individually.
*  Up-front cost  of  insurance.  The team  was  told that  there  is  a  problem  with  the
requirement to pay the premium at the beginning of the crop year, before planting,
when farmers do not necessarily have cash available.
37.  The  survey  of  farmers  and  agricultural  organizations  and  three  representative
regions (one with high penetration of insurance coverage, one with low penetration, and
one with variable penetration)  revealed the following:
*  Only 5% of farmers surveyed were consistently loyal to the program.
*  Most of knowledge of the insurance system was attained through work centers.
*  5% of the farmers had a good understanding of the scheme, however 31% had poor
or no understanding.
*  For farmers who never subscribed, the main reasons were complexity and lack of
funds.  The latter issue was as expected most important with farmers with less than
20 ha (68% of those surveyed) and least important for those with more than 50 ha
(11%).
38.  Most  farmers  are  purchasing  drought  insurance  mainly  because  it  is  now  a
condition for receiving a loan from CNCA.  Farmers can finance the insurance premium
through the loan.  Staff from MoA told the team that they believe that 90 percent of the
subscription to insurance is due to the credit requirement.  This is reflected in the fact that
in 1999-2000, 92 percent of the insurance was sold through CNCA and only eight percent
was sold directly by MAMDA.
39.  The subscription rate for the insurance scheme is much higher in regions where
farmers are better organized and the regional MoA offices have managed to disseminate
information effectively to farmers in their region.  For example, the province of Settat has
12a participation rate of 61 percent for 1999-2000.  Other provinces with high participation
rates are  Safi (63  percent),  Wilaya de  Marrakech  (54 percent),  Wilaya de  Rabat  (52
percent) and Kenitra (48 percent).  Rabat and Kenitra are in the favorable zone, Settat is
located in the intermediate zone, and Marrakech and Safi in the unfavorable zone of the
south.
40.  The experience  of  the current  drought  insurance  scheme  in  Settat  shows  that
participation rates increase significantly following a year in which  indemnification was
paid.
Crop Year  Area Insured in Settat  Indemnification Paid
1995-1996  2,165 ha  No
1996-1997  210 ha  Yes
1997-1998  1,036 ha  No
1998-1999  1,136 ha  Yes
1999-2000  14,511 ha  Yes
Weaknesses of Current Scheme
41.  The current drought insurance scheme has two underlying weaknesses.  First, for
the two higher levels of indemnification it relies on the traditional approach of assessing
individual  yields.  Although  farmers  in  Morocco  seem  to  prefer  individual  farm
assessment,  this  exposes the  insurance scheme to  moral  hazard  and adverse  selection
problems, adds  significantly  to the  administrative costs  of the  insurance  scheme,  and
leads to delays in indemnity payments to the farmers.
42.  The  second  major  drawback  of  the  current  scheme  is  that  the  cost  to  the
government is quite high for relatively limited coverage.  For 1999-2000, the government
paid  around  12  ml.lion  MAD  for  premium  subsidies,  plus  its  120  million  MAD
contribution to the scheme's  indemnity fund, which was used in full to cover indemnity
payments  for  this  year's  drought.  This  investment of  more  than  130 million  MAD
supported insurance coverage for only  111,697 ha, out of a total of more than 5 million
ha used for cereal production in Morocco.  The current program is limited to participation
on a total of 300,000 ha, in part because the government is unable to support the cost of
providing  coverage  for  a  larger  area.  Furthermore,  the  maximum  indemnification
available  under  the  current  scheme  is  3,000  MAD/ha,  which  is  less  than  farmers'
potential  income in a good crop  year.  The current drought  insurance  scheme's  limits
essentially provide coverage for farmers' input costs rather than protecting against loss of
income.  In the next section, the feasibility of insurance based on rainfall is examined to
determine  if such a product could offer an acceptable risk hedge  against drought  to a
larger number of farmers in Morocco at a lower cost to the government.
ANALYSIS OF THE FEASIBILITY  OF RAINFALL  CONTRACTS
43.  The following analysis focuses on Morocco's  three primary cereal crops:  hard
wheat, soft wheat, and barley.  These crops are planted in the fall and subject to basically
the same weather events.  The primary source of information used in this analysis is data
13supplied by the MoA.  These data include the annual production and plantings from the
1978-79 campaign to the 1998-99 campaign.  Since maize data were also supplied, maize
is added to some of the analysis.
Adjusting Yield Data
44.  Data  for the  four  commodities,  barley, hard  and  soft wheat,  and  maize, were
adjusted using procedures described in detail in Annex 2.  Figures  1 and 2 in Annex 2
show the trends in harvested hectares for wheat and barley respectively.  Since 1979, total
hectares of harvested wheat have nearly doubled, with most of the increase in soft wheat.
In the past  20 years,  hectares  of  harvested  wheat have  increased  from just  over  1.5
million ha to between 2.8 and 3.0 million ha, while harvested barley has gone from about
1.6 million to 2.2 million ha.  The data used in Figures 1-4 (Annex 2) are from the USDA
world crop  data  base  and  match  the data  supplied by  the Ministry  of  Agriculture  in
Morocco quite well.
45.  Figures 3 and 4 in Annex 2 show the trends in yield per ha for the national data,
demonstrating that the trends have slowed or reversed for the nation.  Wheat yield
increases have turned flat nationally, and barley yield increases are now negative.  These
trends have two probable explanations:  1) rainfall has been lower on average with more
serious droughts in the 1  990s; and 2) the increased plantings may be occurring on less
productive land with lower yields, bringing the average yield down.  In either case, these
trends raise serious concerns for developing policies to address productivity of cereal
crops in Morocco.
46.  When trying to model risk from natural hazards, it is very common to first attempt
to estimate the value at risk in  today's  terms.  For example,  when modelers  examine
earthquake or hurricane risk, they use current property values and the amount of property
that is in a specific location and then go back through time to estimate how much damage
previous events would do to the current property.  These models are built in the same
fashion.  To estimate the current crop value by location, an average of the previous three
years of plantings are used.  Current prices for each commodity are also used.  The series
of adjusted yields (21 years  by 36 provinces by four crops) is then used to develop  a
matrix of revenues for the specific events in today's terms:
Revenuetp, = Adjusted yieldtpc  x Hectares tpc x Pricec
where  t= year,  1979-1999  : p = province;  1-36: and c = crop;  1-4.
47.  The four crops are maize, barley, and soft and hard wheat.  National prices are
used in all provinces:  190 MAD/quintal for maize;  190 MAD/quintal for barley; 250
MAD/quintal for soft wheat; and 280 MAD/quintal for hard wheat.  For this study, prices
are not allowed to vary.  Nonetheless, there is a negative correlation between prices and
yields in Morocco.  Thus, the estimates of relative risk in revenue are larger than would
be the case if more information about price  and yield relationships  were built into the
modeling  exercise.  The procedure used  estimates of what  the current  year's  revenue
would be if some of the past yields were repeated.  These Monte  Carlo procedures are
empirically based with appropriate adjustments for trend and current distribution of the
crop.  By using the historic yields that are trend adjusted, one preserves the correlation
14among crops and  across space just  as it was realized  over the 21 year period.  These
correlations become very important as they play a major role in the examination of the
risk profile for alternatives that may be tried across any number of provinces and crops in
Morocco.
48.  Table  2 below  presents  the complete matrix  of the estimated  value of the four
crops in today's terms.  The share of total value of the four crops for each province is also
provided.  The total annual value for all four crops is estimated to be 11.4 billion MAD or
about US$1.1 billion.  The three dominant zones are along the coast:  the favorable rain-
fed  zone (bour favorable)  is north  of Casablanca and  has  a 26 percent  share of total
production value for these crops; the intermediate zone includes Casablanca with a 21.1
percent share; and the unfavorable southern rain-fed zone (defavorable  sud) is south of
Casablanca with a 24.3 percent share.  Table 3 demonstrates that there are important and
significant differences in the expected yield per hectare, even within zones.  For example,
even within the more favorable northern zone, soft wheat yields range from 0.5 tons per
hectare to 1.5 tons per hectare.
15Table  2.  Estimates  of Expected  Crop  Value  by Province  and  Zone
(all values  in 1,000  MAD)
Province  Zone  Maize  Barley  Soft Wheat  Hard Wheat  Share
BEN_SLIMANE  B.FAVORABLE  5,609  46,940  182,878  147,117  3.4%
FES  B.FAVORABLE  1,079  55,556  153,683  96,690  2.7%
KENITRA  B.FAVORABLE  6,120  25,738  521,110  79,211  5.5%
KHEMISSET  B.FAVORABLE  11,373  84,339  402,085  94,525  5.2%
MEKNES  B.FAVORABLE  905  11,555  186,866  28,055  2.0%
RABAT  B.FAVORABLE  1,983  6,185  38,882  3,220  0.4%
TAOUNATE  B.FAVORABLE  270  56,597  184,239  154,210  3.5%
TAZA  B.FAVORABLE  1,359  147,179  52,853  171,817  3.3%
BOULMANE  D.ORIENTAL  2,396  23,996  10,539  16,215  0.5%
EL_HOCEIMA  D.ORIENTAL  352  111,593  27,360  5,940  1.3%
FIGUIG  D.ORIENTAL  838  11,081  5,535  3,685  0.2%
GUELMIM  D.ORIENTAL  97  1,436  2,292  277  0.0%
NADOR  D.ORIENTAL  148  285,265  76,246  14,009  3.3%
OUJDA  D.ORIENTAL  0  88,552  67,702  41,642  1.7%
AGADIR  D.SUD  12,057  90,204  100,655  24,683  2.0%
EL_KELAA  D.SUD  2,624  256,759  377,423  248,262  7.8%
ESSAOUIRA  D.SUD  33,391  193,071  12,480  11,191  2.2%
KHOURIBGA  D.SUD  0  210,273  82,110  44,150  3.0%
MARRAKECH  D.SUD  154  259,913  90,708  98,213  3.9%
SAFI  D.SUD  58,140  231,217  159,348  176,976  5.5%
CASABLANCA  INTERMED  8,881  26,292  84,010  25,298  1.3%
EL_JADIDA  INTERMED  123,478  221,160  273,223  353,191  8.5%
SETTAT  INTERMED  45,925  292,185  370,760  577,770  11.3%
AZILAL  MONTAGNE  96  134,862  36,890  50,955  2.0%
B_MELLAL  MONTAGNE  25,935  74,010  723,600  199,660  9.0%
EL_HAJEB  MONTAGNE  600  23,256  145,800  40,698  1.8%
IFRANE  MONTAGNE  359  41,880  33,330  56,000  1.2%
KHENIFRA  MONTAGNE  382  28,118  87,655  91,336  1.8%
ERRACHIDIA  SAHARIEN  5,456  9,440  26,072  59,122  0.9%
OUARZAZATE  SAHARIEN  6,620  67,037  60,186  2,262  1.2%
TATA  SAHARIEN  429  2,315  860  113  0.0%
TIZNIT  SAHARIEN  332  51,437  5,940  228  0.5%
CHEFCHAOUEN  TANGEROIS  749  25,223  73,085  12,748  1.0%
LARACHE  TANGEROIS  217  2,592  34,959  59,025  0.8%
TANGER  TANGEROIS  104  9,841  3,331  49,029  0.5%
TETOUAN  TANGEROIS  152  16,797  11,988  76,832  0.9%
TOTALS BY ZONE TYPE
B.FAVORABLE  28,698  434,089  1,722,596  774,845  26.0%
D.ORIENTAL  3,830  521,923  189,674  81,767  7.0%
D.SUD  106,366  1,241,438  822,723  603,476  24.3%
INTERMED  178,283  539,637  727,993  956,259  21.1%
MONTAGNE  27,371  302,126  1,027,275  438,649  15.7%
SAHARIEN  12,837  130,228  93,058  61,725  2.6%
TANGEROIS  1,222  54,453  123,363  197,633  3.3%
NATIONAL TOTALS  358,610  3,223,894  4,706,683  3,114,355  100%
16Table 3. Estimates  of Current  Yield  per Hectare  (Quintals)
Province  Zone  Maize Barley  Soft  Wheat  Hard  Wheat
BEN_SLIMANE  B.FAVORABLE  8.2  16.6  15.2  13.7
FES  B.FAVORABLE  5.5  9.3  8.9  8.5
KENITRA  B.FAVORABLE  15.1  10.9  9.0  7.8
KHEMISSET  B.FAVORABLE  7.3  11.8  9.3  8.2
MEKNES  B.FAVORABLE  6.5  11.4  11.3  8.9
RABAT  B.FAVORABLE  5.4  8.2  5.0  3.8
TAOUNATE  B.FAVORABLE  6.1  8.4  7.6  6.6
TAZA  B.FAVORABLE  6.5  8.1  8.2  8.1
BOULMANE  D.ORIENTAL  8.8  9.3  7.3  9.0
EL_HOCEIMA  D.ORIENTAL  11.1  9.6  7.4  10.0
FIGUIG  D.ORIENTAL  14.7  9.1  9.4  7.2
GUELMIM  D.ORIENTAL  7.6  2.2  3.7  1.8
NADOR  D.ORIENTAL  11.6  11.7  7.9  11.3
OUJDA  D.ORIENTAL  5.5  4.9  5.2  4.2
AGADIR  D.SUD  16.7  8.5  12.3  3.9
EL_KELAA  D.SUD  14.8  9.1  11.5  7.1
ESSAOUIRA  D.SUD  2.9  4.8  5.5  6.5
KHOURIBGA  D.SUD  NA  8.4  7.2  10.5
MARRAKECH  D.SUD  12.1  7.0  7.4  6.6
SAFI  D.SUD  3.4  6.7  7.8  6.9
CASABLANCA  INTERMED  12.3  17.0  11.2  11.5
EL_JADIDA  INTERMED  6.6  15.4  15.9  9.7
SETTAT  INTERMED  6.4  12.4  12.6  10.4
AZILAL  MONTAGNE  15.3  11.9  8.1  8.4
B_MELLAL  MONTAGNE  35.0  18.0  17.1  8.9
EL_HAJEB  MONTAGNE  8.6  16.2  15.3  14.4
IFRANE  MONTAGNE  8.1  10.1  10.0  10.3
KHENIFRA  MONTAGNE  6.7  9.4  7.0  7.9
ERRACHIDIA  SAHARIEN  14.6  19.8  20.5  16.2
OUARZAZATE  SAHARIEN  13.4  13.5  17.3  13.8
TATA  SAHARIEN  11.3  8.6  12.2  4.3
TIZNIT  SAHARIEN  7.5  2.7  3.5  3.6
CHEFCHAOUEN  TANGEROIS  7.4  9.4  8.7  7.5
LARACHE  TANGEROIS  11.4  13.8  10.2  9.3
TANGER  TANGEROIS  4.1  12.9  10.2  10.5
TETOUAN  TANGEROIS  8.0  12.4  11.2  8.9
1749.  By themselves, the levels of expected yields and revenue  reveal little about the
relative risk.  Given the matrix of 21 years of adjusted yields, a profile of these risks can
be developed as well.  Since expected yields vary  greatly among crops and provinces,
risks measures are normalized by using the coefficient of variation (CV).
CV = Standard Deviation / Mean
50.  CV is a good measure of relative risk as long as the risks are normally distributed,
as most of these are.  The assumption of normality was tested and could not be rejected
for the Moroccan revenue data. 8 Table 4 shows that there are great differences in the risk
profile across Morocco.  As one would expect, the relative risk for the revenue generated
from the four crops is generally lower than the relative risk for the individual crops.  CVs
are only reported for complete data sets of 15 years or greater.  One must be careful in
interpreting  these  values.  For  example,  a  very  low  number  may  simply  mean  that
incomes are consistently  low.  In general however,  they are a reasonable  measure for
sorting relative risk.
This is also likely due to the fact that the revenue data is a portfolio of four crops
18Table 4.  Estimate of Relative Risk (CV) for Revenue
Soft  Hard  Four
Province  Zone  Maize  Barley  Wheat  Wheat  Crop
BEN_SLIMANE  B.FAVORABLE  51%  47%  46%  52%  46%
FES  B.FAVORABLE  44%  42%  49%  49%  46%
KENITRA  B.FAVORABLE  29%  35%  35%  52%  35%
KHEMISSET  B.FAVORABLE  35%  41%  41%  47%  41%
MEKNES  B.FAVORABLE  40%  34%  37%  38%  37%
RABAT  B.FAVORABLE  40%  48%  39%  48%  39%
TAOUNATE  B.FAVORABLE  . 44%  46%  44%  44%
TAZA  B.FAVORABLE  40%  42%  54%  44%  42%
BOULMANE  D.ORIENTAL  32%  32%  48%  28%  28%
EL_HOCEIMA  D.ORIENTAL  30%  33%  39%  42%  32%
FIGUIG  D.ORIENTAL  . 44%  65%  40%  41%
GUELMIM  D.ORIENTAL  . 105%  200%.  164%
NADOR  D.ORIENTAL  35%  35%  43%  32%
OUJDA  D.ORIENTAL  51%  40%  54%  45%
AGADIR  D.SUD  43%  65%  51%  45%  48%
EL_KELAA  D.SUD  87%  58%  55%  52%  54%
ESSAOUIRA  D.SUD  55%  58%  64%  62%  54%
KHOURIBGA  D.SUD  . 63%  65%  62%  62%
MARRAKECH  D.SUD  58%  56%  56%  52%  54%
SAFI  D.SUD  54%  49%  64%  58%  52%
CASABLANCA  INTERMED  46%  44%  51%  54%  47%
EL_JADIDA  INTERMED  48%  49%  44%  69%  50%
SETTAT  INTERMED  61%  61%  68%  79%  70%
AZILAL  MONTAGNE  40%  27%  38%  36%
B_MELLAL  MONTAGNE  31%  57%  35%  41%  36%
EL_HAJEB  MONTAGNE
IFRANE  MONTAGNE  27%  28%  23%  27%  24%
KHENIFRA  MONTAGNE  40%  49%  39%  35%  37%
ERRACHIDIA  SAHARIEN  55%  30%  33%  28%  25%
OUARZAZATE  SAHARIEN  30%  23%  19%  45%  19%
TATA  SAHARIEN  . 71%  51%.  61%
TIZNIT  SAHARIEN  57%  121%  119%.  120%
CHEFCHAOUEN  TANGEROIS  20%  25%  23%  26%  21%
LARACHE  TANGEROIS  35%  23%  26%  25%  20%
TANGER  TANGEROIS  . 32%  29%  29%  30%
TETOUAN  TANGEROIS  27%  25%  19%  21%  20%
Designing Rainfall Contracts to Reduce Relative Risk
51.  The benchmark for reducing risk now becomes the CV measures. Special care is
needed  to  design  rainfall  contacts  that  will  reduce  relative  risk.  Limited  data  were
supplied for monthly rainfall totals; monthly rainfall data that matches the 36 province
names were supplied for only about 30 of the provinces.  These data date from the 1984-
85 crop year forward.  In addition, an international data set was purchased and matched
with  the  data  supplied  by  the Moroccans  for  15 provinces.  In these  provinces,  the
19international data set matched the Moroccan data sets very well.  The international data
begin in 1931, allowing further examination of some important trends in rainfall.
52.  Special care was taken to  fill in missing  data first with  data from  surrounding
provinces for a few limited cases between 1984-85 and 1998-99 and then for the 1978-79
to  1984-85 crop years.  In some cases (about six provinces), no data were available.  In
these cases, the average rainfall for that zone type was calculated and used.  In the end, an
actual or a proxy rainfall measure was obtained for every province.  These data were for
September to April for all provinces and from September to May in the 15 key provinces
studied.  Clearly, this work would have been more robust if more data had been obtained.
However, this makes the results even more encouraging, because they would probably be
improved by more detailed rainfall data.
53.  In a previous  study  (Kumako, 2000),  many different  combinations of monthly
rainfall were examined to identify the combinations that were most highly correlated to
crop yields.  However, Kumako (2000) used only data for the 15 provinces on which this
study is focusing.  The Kumako (2000) study was used to narrow the set of combinations
to be examined.  Clearly, using only 21 years of data to examine these relationship can
result in spurious correlations.  Thus, four factors influenced the selection of key months
for rainfall contracts:
(i)  previous results from the Kumako (2000) study,
(ii)  knowledge of the crop cycles and critical periods for rain,
(iii)  a  cautious  approach  using judgment  and  heuristics  rather  than
simply relying on the correlations, and
(iv)  a constraint that similar periods be used in contiguous geographic
areas.
54.  After learning that September rainfall did not have much influence on yields, the
cumulative rainfall for four periods were examined:
(i)  October to March
(ii)  October to April
(iii)  November to March
(iv)  November to April
55.  Rainfall in May can be important in  a number of areas; however,  May rainfall
data was available for only 15 provinces.  May is more important when maize is added to
the total revenue.  Since wheat and barley are fall-planted crops and are more dominant,
it made sense to combine these crops into one measure of revenue as described above.
The correlations are developed for the four rainfall periods  versus the revenue  for the
three fall planted crops.  Based on these results (shown below in Table 5), it was decided
to  focus  on  three  zones:  favorable  rain-fed  (bour favorable),  unfavorable  south
(defavorable  sud),  and  intermediate.  Correlations  for  these  three  zones  average  69
percent over the full 21-year period.  They increase to an average of 77 percent over the
last decade.  This indicates a higher exposure to rainfall risk, which could be attributed to
increased cultivation of marginal areas that are more susceptible to weather risks and/or
because of the downward trend in average rainfall.  Some isolated  provinces in  other
20zones may also lend themselves to pilot testing.  However, the three key zones comprise
about 71 percent of the total  value of the four crops.  This  fact along with  the higher
correlations are the reasons for focusing on these three zones.  Based on the correlations,
rainfall from November to March is more highly correlated with revenues in the North,
including the bour favorable,  Tangerois, and Orientale zones.  Rainfall for October to
March is used for the rest of the country.
21Table 5.  Correlation Between Revenue and Rainfall
Zone  Province  Rainfall  Pearson  Rainfall  Pearson
Correlatio





B.FAVORABLE  Oct-Mar  76%  Nov-Mar  82%
D.SUD  Oct-Mar  77%  Oct-Mar  82%
INTERMED  Oct-Mar  71%  Oct-Mar  73%
B.FAVORABLE  BEN_SLIMANE  Oct-Mar  77%  Oct-Mar  73%
B.FAVORABLE  FES  Nov-Mar  76%  Nov-Mar  85%
B.FAVORABLE  KENITRA  Oct-Mar  59%  Oct-Mar  65%
B.FAVORABLE  KHEMISSET  Oct-Mar  77%  Oct-Mar  84%
B.FAVORABLE  MEKNES  Nov-Mar  81%  Nov-Mar  85%
B.FAVORABLE  RABAT  Nov-Mar  48%  Nov-Mar  59%
B.FAVORABLE  TAOUNATE  Nov-Mar  69%  Oct-Mar  84%
B.FAVORABLE  TAZA  Nov-Mar  62%  Nov-Mar  91%
D.SUD  AGADIR  Nov-Mar  77%  Nov-Mar  89%
D.SUD  EL_KELAA  Oct-Mar  66%  Oct-Mar  72%
D.SUD  ESSAOUIRA  Nov-Mar  69%  Oct-Mar  82%
D.SUD  KHOURIBGA  Oct-Mar  57%  Oct-Mar  90%
D.SUD  MARRAKECH  Oct-Mar  75%  Oct-Mar  78%
D.SUD  SAFI  Oct-Mar  73%  Oct-Mar  71%
INTERMED  CASABLANCA  Oct-Mar  60%  Oct-Mar  60%
INTERMED  EL_JADIDA  Oct-Mar  63%  Nov-Mar  64%
INTERMED  SETTAT  Oct-Mar  70%  Oct-Mar  69%
Average  69%  77%
REST OF THE COUNTRY
D.ORIENTAL  BOULMANE  Oct-Apr  9%  Oct-Apr  50%
D.ORIENTAL  EL_HOCEIMA  Oct-Apr  35%  Oct-Apr  65%
D.ORIENTAL  FIGUIG  Nov-Mar  36%  Oct-Apr  40%
D.ORIENTAL  GUELMIM  Oct-Apr  23%  Oct-Apr  17%
D.ORIENTAL  NADOR  Nov-Mar  50%  Nov-Mar  60%
D.ORIENTAL  OUJDA  Nov-Mar  58%  Oct-Apr  65%
MONTAGNE  AZILAL  Nov-Mar  71%  Nov-Mar  81%
MONTAGNE  B_MELLAL  Nov-Mar  61%  Oct-Mar  58%
MONTAGNE  EL_HAJEB  Oct-Mar  47%  Nov-Mar  54%
MONTAGNE  IFRANE  Oct-Apr  46%  Oct-Mar  59%
MONTAGNE  KHENIFRA  Oct-Apr  86%  Oct-Mar  94%
SAHARIEN  ERRACHIDIA  Oct-Mar  46%  Oct-Apr  62%
SAHARIEN  OUARZAZATE  Oct-Apr  55%  Oct-Apr  44%
SAHARIEN  TATA  Nov-Mar  68%  Oct-Mar  81%
SAHARIEN  TIZNIT  Oct-Mar  69%  Oct-Mar  79%
TANGEROIS  CHEFCHAOUEN  Nov-Mar  30%  Nov-Mar  37%
TANGEROIS  LARACHE  Nov-Mar  -7%  Oct-Mar  -18%
TANGEROIS  TANGER  Nov-Mar  45%  Oct-Mar  57%
TANGEROIS  TETOUAN  Nov-Mar  24%  Nov-Mar  34%
2256.  A number of alternative rainfall contracts can be considered  (see Skees, 2000).
For this study, the focus is on proportional contracts.  The proportional contract simply
pays in percentage terms for levels of rainfall below a well-specified strike or threshold.
For example, if the median  rainfall in a given province is 300 mm from November to
March, one might begin payments anytime rainfall is below 250 mm.  These payments
would be based on the level below the strike of 250 mm.  The percentage calculation
would be performed as follows:
If rainfall from November to March < 250 mm, then
payment  percentage  = (250 - actual  rain) / 250
For example, if the rainfall is 200 mm, the payment percentage  would be 50/250 or 20
percent.  Those at risk (farmers, agribusinesses, farmer organizations, banks, etc.) would
purchase contracts at some specific value, say  1,000 MAD.  If the payment rate is 20
percent and the insured purchased 10 units of the 1,000 MAD, the actual payment would
equal .20 x 10 x 1000 = 2000 MAD.  The contract could also simply be sold in any MAD
unit value.  The principles are the same:
Indemnity  = payment percentage x total MAD value or liability.
57.  With rainfall contracts, the payment is based solely on the rainfall shortage event.
If crops suffer a serious problem due to freeze, hail, or even excess rain, there may be no
payment.  These contracts offer the advantages outlined earlier and in Skees (2000).  To
make an assessment of how well the rainfall contracts will work, it was simply assumed
that an insured would purchase a value that would equal the median revenue value.  In
this case, the unit is a province.  Therefore, it was assumed that the value of the rainfall
contract is equal to the median revenue.  Now  a very direct  comparison can be made
between the percentage below the rainfall strike and the percentage  below the median
revenue.  In addition, the rainfall strikes were developed so that every province would
pay the  same premium  rate  for  rainfall insurance-either  10 percent  or  five percent.
Premium rates are the average of the percentage payments over the 21  -year period.  Table
6 shows the median rainfall and the trigger or strike rainfall levels for both the 10 percent
and  five percent  premium  contracts  in  each  of the  seventeen  provinces  in the  three
recommended zones.
23Table 6.  Median Rainfall and Strike Rainfall for 10% and 5% Contract
Median  10% Prem  5% Prem  Median
Rainfall  Trigger  Trigger  Revenue
Province  Zone  mm  mm  mm  1,000 MAD
BEN_SLIMANE  B.FAVORABLE  337  291  229  371,414
FES  B.FAVORABLE  253  225  190  307,836
KENITRA  B.FAVORABLE  400  304  208  657,184
KHEMISSET  B.FAVORABLE  337  291  229  602,410
MEKNES  B.FAVORABLE  328  300  251  220,858
RABAT  B.FAVORABLE  325  302  232  51,961
TAOUNATE  B.FAVORABLE  337  291  229  411,429
TAZA  B.FAVORABLE  355  291  227  365,672
AGADIR  D.SUD  200  169  126  199,784
EL_KELAA  D.SUD  264  207  169  763,529
ESSAOUIRA  D.SUD  243  196  157  263,937
KHOURIBGA  D.SUD  272  254  205  305,499
MARRAKECH  D.SUD  177  138  108  504,918
SAFI  D.SUD  280  239  191  655,781
CASABLANCA  INTERMED  294  243  185  170,130
EL_JADIDA  INTERMED  322  291  211  1,104,407
SETTAT  INTERMED  305  272  210  1,694,888
58.  Premium payments are simple to calculate:
Premium payment = Premium rate x total MAD value or liability
For example, a farmer  purchasing rainfall insurance with  a value  or liability  equal to
10,000 MAD would pay 10,000 x .1 = 1,000 MAD.
59.  At  this  point,  estimates  comparing  gross  revenue  for  the  province  with  no
insurance and with rainfall insurance can be developed.  With insurance, one adds any
indemnity payments and subtracts the premium values from the revenue values with no
insurance:
With  Insurance  Revenuetpc = Revenuetp,  + Indemnity  - Premiumtpc
where t= year, 1979-1999 : p=province; 1-17: and c=crop; 1-4
Premium = either the 0.10 or the 0.05 rate x median income
Indemnity = payment percentage x median income
60.  It is now possible to make a direct comparison of relative risk with and without
the rainfall contracts.  Table  7 presents these results  for both  the  10 percent  and five
percent contracts.  As one would expect, the reductions in relative risk are significantly
greater with the 10 percent contract than the five percent contact.  The weighted average
relative  risk is 42 percent without insurance.  This declines  to  36 percent with  a  five
percent insurance contract and to 30 percent with  a  10 percent  insurance contract.  In
percentage terms, the relative risk goes down by 14 percent with the five percent contract
24and by 29 percent with the 10 percent contract across these 17 provinces.  In either case,
the results are encouraging as the rainfall contracts demonstrate value in reducing risk.
Table 7. Reduction  in Relative  Risk With  Rainfall  Contracts
CV with  CV  with  Reduction  CV with  Reduction
No  10%  with 10%  5%  with 5%
Insurance  Contract  Contract  Contract  Contract
BEN_SLIMANE  B.FAVORABLE  46%  35%  -24%  40%  -13%
FES  B.FAVORABLE  46%  37%  -20%  41%  -11%
KENITRA  B.FAVORABLE  35%  23%  -34%  28%  -20%
KHEMISSET  B.FAVORABLE  41%  29%  -29%  34%  -17%
MEKNES  B.FAVORABLE  37%  27%  -27%  31%  -16%
RABAT  B.FAVORABLE  39%  33%  -15%  35%  -10%
TAOUNATE  B.FAVORABLE  44%  33%  -25%  37%  -16%
TAZA  B.FAVORABLE  42%  32%  -24%  35%  -17%
AGADIR  D.SUD  48%  44%  -8%  46%  -4%
EL_KELAA  D.SUD  54%  46%  -15%  50%  -7%
ESSAOUIRA  D.SUD  54%  42%  -22%  48%  -11%
KHOURIBGA  D.SUD  62%  56%  -10%  58%  -6%
MARRAKECH  D.SUD  54%  45%  -17%  49%  -9%
SAFI  D.SUD  52%  41%  -21%  45%  -13%
CASABLANCA  INTERMED  48%  37%  -23%  41%  -15%
EL_JADIDA  INTERMED  40%  30%  -25%  35%  -13%
SETTAT  INTERMED  63%  50%  -21%  56%  -11%
Total  Market  Total Market  42%  30%  -29%  36%  -14%
61.  Analysis for Kenitra gives a clear view of how these contracts stop the downside
risk in revenue for the province.  Significant income losses are replaced in  1981, 1992,
1993, and  1995 for this case.  One can also  see that the revenue  without insurance is
consistently higher in years when there are no losses.  At this point it becomes useful to
index everything  so  that  any  different  unit  values  can  be  expressed  as  percentages.
Indexing gives a direct comparison of the revenue changes with and without insurance.
All values can be easily indexed now by using the ratio of actual revenue in a given year
over the median revenue:
REVINDEX = Actual revenuetp  / Median Revenuep
where t = year and p = province (note there is no c as revenue is for all 4 crops)
Since premium rate and rainfall contract payments are also percentages, it is now easy to
adjust the REVINDEX value to reflect the effect after a purchase of insurance:
REVINS = REVINDEX + Payment percentage - Premium rate (either 0.10 or 0:05)
62.  The details of these indexes appear in Table 8.  For example,  1995 is the worse
year in the 21 year period.  In this year, revenue from the four crops was 28 percent  of
normal.  Under a 10 percent contract, the rainfall payment percentage is 50 percent.  The
premium rate is 10 percent.  Thus the REVINS = 28 percent + 50 percent -10 percent
2568 percent.  Obviously, 68 percent of revenue is much better than 28 percent.  Had the
five percent premium rate contract been used the results would have been less favorable
but still good: REVINS =28 percent +27 percent -5 percent = 50 percent rather than 28
percent of the normal revenue.
26Table 8.  Kenitra Revenue with and without Rainfall Insurance
Revenue  Revenue  10% Ins  Revenue With  5% Ins
Without Ins./  With 10% Ins/  Payment  5% Ins/  Payment
Median Rev  Median Rev  Percentage  Median Rev  Percentage
1979  87%  77%  0%  82%  0%
1980  105%  95%  0%  100%  0%
1981  47%  66%  29%  42%  0%
1982  115%  105%  0%  110%  0%
1983  118%  108%  0%  113%  0%
1984  101%  106%  15%  96%  0%
1985  84%  74%  0%  79%  0%
1986  112%  102%  0%  107%  0%
1987  80%  70%  0%  75%  0%
1988  109%  99%  0%  104%  0%
1989  94%  84%  0%  89%  0%
1990  100%  90%  0%  95%  0%
1991  99%  89%  0%  94%  0%
1992  49%  101%  61%  88%  44%
1993  37%  83%  55%  67%  35%
1994  149%  139%  0%  144%  0%
1995  28%  68%  50%  50%  27%
1996  114%  104%  0%  109%  0%
1997  81%  71%  0%  76%  0%
1998  155%  145%  0%  150%  0%
1999  121%  111%  0%  116%  0%
63.  These  indexes  also  afford  an  opportunity  to  examine  the  performance  of  the
rainfall insurance contract in more detail.  Clearly one would like to receive payments
from rainfall contracts in the crop years with the worst revenue shortfalls.  The 21 years
of revenue data were sorted from the worst year to the best year.  The poorest three years
were then identified for each province.  The question then becomes, does the REVINS
index exceed these three years?  If so, this suggests that buying  rainfall insurance will
make the province better off in the lowest  15 percent of the events, or in the years that
represent one in  seven year events.  This is  a reasonable  expectation  for this  type  of
insurance, yet it is a difficult test because payments are based solely on rainfall events for
an extended time.  In addition, some of the rainfall data is not even from stations within
the provinces but is the average for the zone.
64.  Table  9 provides  detail  for the underpayments  in the  lowest three  years.  The
lowest year represents a one in 21 year event; the second lowest year is approximately a
one in 10 year event and the third lowest year is a one in seven year event.  The values in
the table under each of these categories are the difference between the lowest revenue
value  and the  REVINS  value.  For  example, there  would  be  no  rainfall  payment  in
Marrakech in 1987 because the REVINS value is 21 percent.  The value in the one in 21
year column is four percent, which means that REVINS is four percent below the lowest
REVINDEX value.  The value in the one in seven year column is 10 percent below the
27third lowest REVINDEX value.  It is interesting to note that only two events have lower
REVINS values than the lowest values of revenue.  With 17 provinces and 21 years, there
is  a  total  of  357 events,  so having  only  two  events  that  are  lower  than  the  lowest
REVINEX suggests that this would happen less than one percent of the time.  Even the
one in seven year event only occurs 10 times or about three percent  of the time.  Under
the five percent premium rate contract, this value increases to about seven percent.
Table 9.  Underpayments Based on Lowest 3 Years of Revenue
REVINS as percent points below
REVINDEX in an event with
Frequency:  _  Payment
Year  Region  REVINDEX  REVINS  >1 in 21  >1 in 10  > 1 in 7  Percentage
10%  Premium  Contract
1983  KHOURIBGA  5%  -5%  10%  32%  34%  0%
1987  MARRAKECH  31%  21%  4%  6%  10%  0%
1993  AGADIR  39%  59%  5%  11%  30%
1983  EL_KELAA  6%  27%  19%  27%  32%
1990  EL_KELAA  54%  44%  2%  10%  0%
1984  KHOURIBGA  30%  20%  7%  10%  0%
1993  SAFI  35%  27%  5%  8%  2%
1983  SETTAT  6%  7%  .2%  3%  11%
1992  FES  25%  33%  2%  18%
1995  RABAT  10%  34%  18%  34%
5% Premium  Contract
1983  KHOURIBGA  5%  0%  5%  27%  30%  0%
1983  SETTAT  6%  1%  5%  8%  9%  0%
1995  ESSAOUIRA  18%  18%  3%  6%  5%
1993  AGADIR  39%  41%  24%  30%  7%
1981  EL_JADIDA  24%  39%  7%  12%  20%
1983  EL_KELAA  6%  16%  30%  38%  16%
1992  FES  25%  23%  2%  13,%  3%
1981  KHEMISSET  38%  35%  3%  12%  2%
1984  KHOURIBGA  30%  25%  2%  5%  0%
1987  MARRAKECH  31%  26%  1%  5%  0%
1995  RABAT  10%  19%  15%  33%  14%
1993  SAFI  35%  30%  3%  5%  0%
1995  SAFI  9%  29%  4%  6%  25%
1987  AGADIR  70%  65%  5%  0%
1981  BEN_SLIMANE  49%  46%  3%  2%
1995  BEN_SLIMANE  8%  48%  1%  44%
1981  CASABLANCA  50%  45%  5%  0%
1995  CASABLANCA  12%  40%  10%  34%
1990  EL_KELAA  54%  49%  5%  0%
1981  KENITRA  47%  42%  5%  0%
1981  MEKNES  55%  50%  .5%  0%
1992  MEKNES  46%  55%  0%  13%
1993  RABAT  34%  44%  8%  16%
1993  TAZA  43%  39%  .4%  1%
28Rainfall Plus Area Revenue Contracts
65.  These results raise some questions about how much value might  be obtained if
one  combined  the  rainfall  contracts  with  area  revenue  insurance  (with  area  yields
varying, but prices and area remaining constant).  Therefore, an area revenue policy was
developed that  would  pay when  the rainfall payment  was  less than  a  calculated area
revenue contract.
Area revenue payment = (Trigger on revenue - actual revenue) / Trigger on revenue
If percentage payment for rainfall < area revenue payment
then the new payment equal the area revenue payment.
To keep it affordable,  the area revenue  policy was set  so that the pure  premium  rate
would equal two percent.  Thus, the combined pure premium would equal 12 percent (10
percent for the rainfall contract and two percent for the added value of the area revenue
contract).
66.  The combination of rainfall and area yield gives added reduction in relative risk.
For only a two percent premium rate, the three-zone area relative risk can be decreased
by about four percentage points,  down to  28 percent relative risk.  This is 33 percent
below the relative risk without insurance (42 percent).  Furthermore, there are only three
cases where the REVINS index would not be greater than the third lowest revenue.  Thus
the added value can be significant.  Beyond this advantage of the combined policy, the
combination  may  also  make  reinsurance  in  the  international  capital  markets  more
affordable for Morocco.  The capital markets may be more willing  to insure  or hedge
against  rainfall  risk  than  against  area  yields  that  are  developed  by  the  Moroccan
government.
Understanding the Profile of Risk for Morocco
67.  The model now allows an examination of the implications of various contracts on
the aggregate losses for a potential test market of the three zones.  Table  10 presents the
loss ratio for the sum of all indemnities over the sum of all premiums for the market area.
Premiums and losses are set based on the median revenue.  The implicit assumption is
that participation levels would be the same throughout the region. Table  10 gives some
reason for concern:  loss ratios exceed  100 percent  in seven of the years.  Thus a loss
ratio in  excess  of  100 percent  occurs  in  about  one out  of  every  three  years.  To  be
explicit, if 10 million MAD is insured at a premium rate of  10 percent,  premiums of  I
million MAD will be collected.  If the 1995 event is repeated, and the loss ratio is 500
percent, total losses will be 5 million MAD.  With only 1 million MAD in premiums, the
net losses would be 4 million MAD.  Of issue here is how to finance indemnity payments
in excess of premiums collected.
29Table 10.  Various Aggregate Loss Ratios
Loss Ratio  Loss Ratio  Loss Ratio for
for a 10%  for  Residual
Rainfall  Combined  2% Area Yield
Year  Contracts  Policy  Contract
79  2%  0%  10%
80  7%  8%  0%
81  289%  281%  327%
82  40%  35%  70%
83  233%  140%  701%
84  142%  170%  0%
85  4%  5%  1%
86  5%  6%  0%
87  106%  101%  127%
88  0%  0%  0%
89  9%  10%  0%
90  6%  6%  4%
91  0%  0%  0%
92  359%  398%  166%
93  351%  383%  191%
94  0%  0%  0%
95  494%  496%  480%
96  0%  0%  0%
97  3%  0%  18%
98  0%  0%  0%
99  51%  61%  3%
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
68.  Nearly half of the people in Morocco live in rural areas, and agriculture accounts
for almost one-fifth of the country's  GDP on average.  Moroccan agriculture  is highly
dependent on rainfall and other climatic variations, and production fluctuates widely due
to these variations.  This  is especially true for cereal production,  which constitutes the
most significant agricultural resource.  Drought is a recurring problem in Morocco, and in
addition to the risk management techniques currently employed by farmers, they should
also  be  encouraged to  explore  other methods  such as  dry-land farming  techniques  in
order to decrease their exposure to drought risk.
69.  The government has incurred increasingly significant drought-related costs, both
for  direct  subsidies  and  relief  programs  for  farmers  (6.5  billion  drought  catastrophe
program in 1999-2000) and for expenses indirectly related to the drought problem, such
as capital injections for CNCA due to the high level of non-performing agricultural (and
other) loans.  The government is seeking ways to help farmers' manage their drought risk
while controlling its fiscal costs.
70.  MAMDA has implemented a government-subsidized drought  insurance scheme,
which,  starting  in  1999-2000,  is  partially  based  on  area  yield.  The  government
30contributes  120 million  MAD per  year to  this  scheme,  plus  partial  subsidies  of  the
farmers'  premium payments.  The program is limited to an area of 300,000 ha, of which
only 111,697 ha were subscribed last year.  Although the participation rate is rather low,
it has increased  due  to  CNCA's  requirement  that  insurance  be purchased  in  order  to
obtain a crop loan.  In 1999-2000, CNCA sold about 92 percent of all drought insurance
policies, while MAMDA sold about eight percent.  Indemnities  under this program are
limited to  1,000 MAD/ha; 2,000 MAD/ha; or 3,000 MAD/ha, which is a constraint.  The
current scheme is limited not only in indemnification levels, but also in the area covered,
and it is heavily dependent on government subsidies.  In addition,  because Level 2 and
Level  3 insurance  is based on  assessments of  individual farm  yields, there are moral
hazard and adverse selection risks, and the indemnification process is slow and costly to
administer.
71.  A drought insurance  program based on rainfall contracts  could have potentially
significant benefits  over the  current  scheme.  For example  using  an  objective trigger
event should minimize moral hazard and adverse selection risk and promote a more rapid,
streamlined  pay-out  process,  in  addition  to  increasing  the  potential  interest  of
international  re-insurers  and  capital  markets  in  investing  in  the  program.  Based  on
analysis of rainfall and cereal yield data across the country, this study has determined that
a rainfall index-based insurance product could be feasible  in Morocco.  The statistical
correlation between rainfall and cereal revenue appears to be sufficiently strong in the 17
provinces in the bour favorable,  defavorable  sud, and  intermediaire  climatic zones to
support such a product (Table 5, above).  Using data from a 21 year period, the trigger or
strike rainfall level was determined for each of the 17 provinces for both a  10 percent
premium contract and a five percent premium contract (Tables 6 and 7, above).  These
proportional contracts would pay the insured an amount based on the shortfall of actual
rainfall during  a determined period compared  to the trigger rainfall,  and the  contracts
could be purchased in any amount, allowing farmers to insure the full amount of their
expected revenue.
72.  Given  the  encouraging  results  of  this  feasibility  analysis,  we  recommend  to
consider introducing proportional  rainfall insurance  contracts on a pilot  basis in a few
select provinces in Morocco.  In selecting the provinces for the pilot  scheme, it will be
important to  test the product in  all three recommended  agro-climatic  zones.  Using a
variety  of agro-climatic zones will help diversify the rainfall risk within Morocco  and
make the rainfall insurance contracts more attractive to MAMDA and foreign reinsurance
companies.  Future research will focus on further exploring the benefits of the proposed
rainfall insurance scheme using historical simulations, where possible, and also making
some assessment of the demand for rainfall index contracts.
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32ANNEX 1:  CALCULATING A DROUGHT THRESHOLD
In  1998  Barakat  and  Handoufe  worked  on  agricultural  drought-related  problems  in
Morocco.  In  fact,  drought  may  be  defined  and  viewed  from  different  angles.
Accordingly, they defined agricultural drought as a rainfall deficit sufficient to cause a
significant reduction  in agricultural production.  In the past it has been difficult to set a
minimum rainfall threshold  below which  a drought  year may be  declared nationwide.
Many authors used to set a threshold arbitrarily (e.g., rainfall below  10% of normal), but
these  methods  are  not  realistic.  Barakat  and  Handoufe  instead  used  agricultural
production data for which they estimated the normal value through  a regression across
time.  They then determined the production threshold below which production in a given
year  is  considered  drought-stricken.  The  estimation  was  based  on  a  95  percent
confidence interval on the regression line.  The formula used for the confidence interval
was:
Sy(x)-t,  2  1 + (x 0 -x) 
2  xyn+-  SSEx ~
where n, xo, x, y(x 0), cT 2x.y  and SSEx are respectively the number of observations, the
corresponding year, the mean value of observed years, the calculated value of production
from the regression,  the residual  variance  and the  sum of  squared  errors  of  x..  The
Student t value with n-2 degrees of freedom is denoted by tj_w 2. Any production level
below the lower bound of the confidence interval is considered to be a drought year.  The
study was based on eight selected rainfall stations that were found to be representative of
the country based on specified criteria.  They also measured drought intensity across time
as stated above.  Different methods such as the Palmer Drought Severity Index are also
currently used to measure drought intensity.  The method used by Barakat and Handoufe
is based on the following formula:
DI,=  I OO(S-Px)/S
where Dlx is the drought intensity during a given year x, S being the lower bound of the
confidence interval stated previously and Px the cereal production during year x. In their
work, they also set different  rainfall deficit thresholds between  October and  May (the
production period) for the eight selected rainfall stations in cereal production regions (see
Table A. 1).




Rainfall  Security  Alarm  Tolerance  Critical  Maximum  Year
(mm)  Threshold  Threshold  Threshold  Threshold  Deficit
Taza
(629.2)  31.2  32.2  38.9  39.7  69.0  1994/95
Meknes
(555.2)  19.3  31.0  32.5  34.5  53.7  1994/95
Azilal
(508.0)  22.7  25.2  37.1  41.3  70.0  1980/81
Fes
(503.2)  26.5  26.9  33.4  34.3  68.9  1994/95
Khemisset
(483.8)  17.8  20.1  27.5  34.3  50.7  1994/95
Ben Slimane
(458.6)  10.5  20.1  30.2  38.9  70.2  1994/95
Safi
(366.0)  13.3  25.2  26.2  36.6  60.0  1986/87
Settat
(358.2)  17.2  25.5  41.8  45.2  60.2  1994/95
Average  19.8  25.8  33.5  38.1  62.9
Coefficient
of Variation  34.3  17.0  16.5  10.3  12.5
CV (%)  .
Source: Barakat and Handoufe, 1998.
Note:  In the above table,
The security threshold is the deficit reached without any fear of drought.
- The alarm threshold corresponds to the minimum rainfall deficit registered during a drought year.
- The tolerance threshold is the maximum deficit reached without the occurrence of a drought.
- The critical threshold is the deficit from which the occurrence of a drought is certain.
- The maximum deficit is the greatest deficit reached during the time series studied.
They found a linear relationship between the drought index estimated (DI) and the
production deviation to the normal (Y). The relationship was: Y = 2.253(DI)+ 17,790
with a coefficient of determination,  R  = 0.925.
34ANNEX 2:  DE-TRENDING  YIELD DATA
Data for the four commodities, barley, hard and soft wheat, and maize, were de-trended
using robust procedures that have been used to de-trend county yield data for the U.S.
area-based crop insurance program, The Group Risk Plan.  These procedures involve a
customized windsoring technique and use of linear splines.  Linear splines are used when
there  is  a  major  change  in the  system  during  a time-series.  In  this  case,  Morocco
significantly expanded plantings in the late  1980s.  A linear  spline basically allows for
fitting of two linear regressions  over the 21 year period with  a knot  in and around the
year 1988.  An SAS software package was used to fit these data.  A nonlinear procedure
smoothes the data around the knot.  The windsoring technique involves fitting the spline
two times.  In the first fit, outliers are identified.  The second fit dampens the influence of
outliers by either capping or cupping them.
Figures 1 and 2 show the trends in harvested hectares for wheat and barley respectively.
Since 1979, the harvested wheat hectares has nearly doubled, with most of this increase
in soft wheat.  Wheat production has increased  from just  over  1.5 million hectares to
between 2.8 and 3.0 million in the past 20 years, while barley production has gone from
around  1.6 million to  2.2 million hectares.  The data used in  Figures  1-4 are from the
USDA world crop data base and match the data supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture
in Morocco  quite well.  Figures  3 and 4 show  the trends in  yield per  hectare for the
national data.  They demonstrate that the trends have slowed or reversed for the nation.
Wheat  yield  increases  have  turned  flat  national  and  barley  yield  increases  are  now
negative.  Two probable factors may help explain these trends:  1) rainfall has been lower
on average with more serious droughts in the 1990s; and 2) the increased plantings are
probably occurring on less productive land with lower yields, bringing the average yield
down.  In either case, there are  serious concerns about how to develop policies to address
productivity of cereal crops in Morocco.
Trends were  developed  for every province  and crop.  These trends  were  then used to
adjust the historic yields for today's  conditions.  A rather straightforward and commonly
used adjustment process was implemented whereby the ratio of the actual yield to the
trend yield was multiplied  by the 1999 forecast yield.  These procedures also provide a
simple means to adjust for heteroscedasticity (i.e., the variance in the yields around trend
are increasing through time).
Adjusted Yieldt = (Actual yieldt / Trend yieldt) x Forecasted 1999 Yield
where t = 1960 to 1999 for the figures and 1979 to 1999 for the province data.
Once data are normalized for any trends, it becomes possible to examine the risk profile
for various provinces and then to aggregate that risk into any level desired (e.g., country
or zone).
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